Presence often is considered the most important quale describing the subjective feeling of being in a computer-generated and/or computer-mediated virtual environment. The identification and separation of orthogonal presence components, i.e., the place illusion and the plausibility illusion, has been an accepted theoretical model describing Virtual Reality (VR) experiences for some time. This perspective article challenges this presence-oriented VR theory. First, we argue that a place illusion cannot be the major construct to describe the much wider scope of Virtual, Augmented, and Mixed Reality (VR, AR, MR: or XR for short). Second, we argue that there is no plausibility illusion but merely plausibility, and we derive the place illusion caused by congruent and plausible generation of spatial cues, and similarly for all the current model's so-defined illusions. Finally, we propose congruence and plausibility to become the central essential conditions in a novel theoretical model describing XR experiences and effects.

翻译：存在通常被认为是描述在计算机产生和(或)计算机中介虚拟环境中的主观感觉的最重要之谜。 辨别和分离正视存在组成部分,即地点幻觉和可信幻觉,是一段时期以来描述虚拟现实(VR)经验的公认的理论模型。 这一观点文章挑战了面向存在的VR理论。 首先,我们认为,定位幻觉不能成为描述虚拟、增强和混合现实(VR、AR、MR、或XR)范围更广得多的主要构思。 其次,我们争论说,不存在可信幻觉,而仅仅是可相信性,我们从空间提示的和谐和貌似生成中得出地方错觉,对于当前模型中所有定义的幻觉来说也是如此。 最后,我们提议,在描述XR经验和效果的新理论模型中,兼容性和合理性不能成为核心基本条件。