Safety alignment of Large Language Models (LLMs) can be compromised with manual jailbreak attacks and (automatic) adversarial attacks. Recent work suggests that patching LLMs against these attacks is possible: manual jailbreak attacks are human-readable but often limited and public, making them easy to block; adversarial attacks generate gibberish prompts that can be detected using perplexity-based filters. In this paper, we show that these solutions may be too optimistic. We propose an interpretable adversarial attack, \texttt{AutoDAN}, that combines the strengths of both types of attacks. It automatically generates attack prompts that bypass perplexity-based filters while maintaining a high attack success rate like manual jailbreak attacks. These prompts are interpretable and diverse, exhibiting strategies commonly used in manual jailbreak attacks, and transfer better than their non-readable counterparts when using limited training data or a single proxy model. We also customize \texttt{AutoDAN}'s objective to leak system prompts, another jailbreak application not addressed in the adversarial attack literature. %, demonstrating the versatility of the approach. We can also customize the objective of \texttt{AutoDAN} to leak system prompts, beyond the ability to elicit harmful content from the model, demonstrating the versatility of the approach. Our work provides a new way to red-team LLMs and to understand the mechanism of jailbreak attacks.

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