In an instance of the weighted Nash Social Welfare problem, we are given a set of $m$ indivisible items, $\mathscr{G}$, and $n$ agents, $\mathscr{A}$, where each agent $i \in \mathscr{A}$ has a valuation $v_{ij}\geq 0$ for each item $j\in \mathscr{G}$. In addition, every agent $i$ has a non-negative weight $w_i$ such that the weights collectively sum up to $1$. The goal is to find an assignment $\sigma:\mathscr{G}\rightarrow \mathscr{A}$ that maximizes $\prod_{i\in \mathscr{A}} \left(\sum_{j\in \sigma^{-1}(i)} v_{ij}\right)^{w_i}$, the product of the weighted valuations of the players. When all the weights equal $\frac1n$, the problem reduces to the classical Nash Social Welfare problem, which has recently received much attention. In this work, we present a $5\cdot\exp\left(2\cdot D_{\text{KL}}(\mathbf{w}\, ||\, \frac{\vec{\mathbf{1}}}{n})\right) = 5\cdot\exp\left(2\log{n} + 2\sum_{i=1}^n w_i \log{w_i}\right)$-approximation algorithm for the weighted Nash Social Welfare problem, where $D_{\text{KL}}(\mathbf{w}\, ||\, \frac{\vec{\mathbf{1}}}{n})$ denotes the KL-divergence between the distribution induced by $\mathbf{w}$ and the uniform distribution on $[n]$. We show a novel connection between the convex programming relaxations for the unweighted variant of Nash Social Welfare presented in \cite{cole2017convex, anari2017nash}, and generalize the programs to two different mathematical programs for the weighted case. The first program is convex and is necessary for computational efficiency, while the second program is a non-convex relaxation that can be rounded efficiently. The approximation factor derives from the difference in the objective values of the convex and non-convex relaxation.

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