Ineffective Fault Analysis (SIFA) was introduced as a new approach to attack block ciphers at CHES 2018. Since then, they have been proven to be a powerful class of attacks, with an easy to achieve fault model. One of the main benefits of SIFA is to overcome detection-based and infection-based countermeasures. In this paper we explain how the principles of SIFA can be applied to GIMLI, an authenticated encryption cipher participating the NIST-LWC competition. We identified two possible rounds during the intialization phase of GIMLI to mount our attack. If we attack the first location we are able to recover 3 bits of the key uniquely and the parity of 8 key-bits organized in 3 sums using 180 ineffective faults per biased single intermediate bit. If we attack the second location we are able to recover 15 bits of the key uniquely and the parity of 22 key-bits organized in 7 sums using 340 ineffective faults per biased intermediate bit. Furthermore, we investigated the influence of the fault model on the rate of ineffective faults in GIMLI. Finally, we verify the efficiency of our attacks by means of simulation.

翻译：在CHES 2018年,作为攻击区块密码的新方法,引入了无效失灵分析(SIFA),作为在CHES 2018年攻击区块密码的新方法。从那时以来,这些密码被证明是一个强大的攻击类别,容易达到故障模式。SIMFA的主要好处之一是克服基于检测和基于感染的反措施。在本文中,我们解释了如何将SIFA的原则适用于GIMLI, 参加NIST-LWC竞争的认证加密密码。我们确定了在GIMLI绝缘阶段发动攻击的两轮可能。如果我们在第一个地点进行攻击,我们就能独家收回3位关键字,并且利用每个偏差中间点用180个无效的断层,将8个关键字分成3个。如果我们在第二个地点进行攻击,我们就能用每个偏差中间点340个无效的断层来回收15位的钥匙和22个关键字的等值。此外,我们调查了错误模型对GIMLI无效误差率率的影响。最后,我们通过模拟手段核查了我们攻击的效率。