This work studies a dynamic mechanism design problem in which a principal delegates decision makings to a group of privately-informed agents without the monetary transfer or burning. We consider that the principal privately possesses complete knowledge about the state transitions and study how she can use her private observation to support the incentive compatibility of the delegation via informational burning, a process we refer to as the looking-forward persuasion. The delegation mechanism is formulated in which the agents form belief hierarchies due to the persuasion and play a dynamic Bayesian game. We propose a novel randomized mechanism, known as Bayesian promised delegation (BPD), in which the periodic incentive compatibility is guaranteed by persuasions and promises of future delegations. We show that the BPD can achieve the same optimal social welfare as the original mechanism in stationary Markov perfect Bayesian equilibria. A revelation-principle-like design regime is established to show that the persuasion with belief hierarchies can be fully characterized by correlating the randomization of the agents' local BPD mechanisms with the persuasion as a direct recommendation of the future promises.

翻译：这项工作研究一个动态机制设计问题,主要代表向一组私人知情的代理人作出不进行货币转移或燃烧的决策,我们认为,主要私人完全了解国家过渡的情况,并研究她如何利用私人观察来支持代表团通过信息燃烧的激励兼容性,我们称之为 " 向前看 " 的说服程序;代表团机制的制定,使代理人由于说服而形成信仰等级,并玩一个动态的巴耶斯游戏;我们提议一个新颖的随机化机制,称为巴耶西亚承诺的代表团,其中通过未来代表团的劝说和许诺保证定期奖励的兼容性;我们表明,BPD可以实现与固定的马尔科夫完美的巴耶西亚电子利利比亚原始机制相同的最佳社会福利;建立了一种创新式的设计制度,表明与信仰等级挂钩的说服可以通过将代理人的当地BDD机制随机化作为未来承诺的直接建议来充分定性。