Federated Byzantine Agreement Systems (FBASs) offer a solution to consensus in permissionless systems by adapting the well-studied Byzantine agreement model to permissionless consensus. Unlike its counterparts in the context of permissionless consensus, the FBAS system model does not offer validating nodes protocol-level incentives although they are entrusted with safeguarding and ensuring the functionality of the system. Multiple studies have reported on the small number of active validators in these systems leading to some concerns about their resilience. To this end, this paper studies how rewards can be distributed in FBASs and presents a fair reward distribution function for FBASs. The challenge is that, on the one hand, consensus in an FBAS is found jointly between all nodes and, on the other hand, nodes do not all contribute equally to this process. We draw on game-theoretic methods to quantify these contributions bearing the overall health of the FBAS in mind and present a fair reward distribution function which we evaluate based on a set of identified properties.

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