We study how long-lived, rational, exponentially discounting agents learn in a social network. In every period, each agent observes the past actions of his neighbors, receives a private signal, and chooses an action with the objective of matching the state. Since agents behave strategically, and since their actions depend on higher order beliefs, it is difficult to characterize equilibrium behavior. Nevertheless, we show that regardless of the size and shape of the network, and the patience of the agents, the equilibrium speed of learning is bounded from above by a constant that only depends on the private signal distribution.

翻译：我们研究的是社会网络中长期、理性、指数化的折价代理商在社会网络中学习的时间。 在每个时期,每个代理商观察其邻居的过去行动,接收私人信号,并选择匹配国家的行动。 由于代理商的行为是战略性的,并且由于他们的行动取决于更高的秩序信念,因此很难描述平衡行为。 然而,我们表明,不管网络的规模和形状以及代理商的耐心,学习的平衡速度都与仅取决于私人信号分布的常数紧密相连。