Multi-hop wireless networks with autonomous nodes are susceptible to selfish traffic remapping attacks (TRAs). Nodes launching TRAs leverage the underlying channel access function to receive unduly high quality of service (QoS) for packet flows traversing source-to-destination routes. TRAs are easy to execute, impossible to prevent, difficult to detect, and harmful to the QoS of honest nodes. Recognizing the need for providing QoS security, we use a novel network-oriented QoS metric to propose a self-enforcing game-theoretic mitigation approach. By switching between TRA and honest behavior, selfish nodes engage in a noncooperative multistage game in pursuit of high QoS. We analyze feasible node strategies and design a distributed signaling mechanism called DISTRESS, under which, given certain conditions, the game produces a desirable outcome: after an upper-bounded play time, honesty tends to become a selfish node's best-reply behavior, while yielding acceptable QoS to most or all nodes. We verify these findings by Monte Carlo and ns-3 simulations of static and mobile nodes.

翻译：具有自主节点的多点无线网络很容易受到自私的交通重新绘图攻击(TRAs) 。 启动节点的TRAs利用基本的频道接入功能获得过高质量的服务(Qos),用于传输源到目的地的路径。 TRAs很容易执行,不可能预防,难以检测,而且对诚实节点的QOS有害。 我们认识到需要提供QOS安全,因此我们使用创新的网络导向的QOS衡量标准来提出自我强化游戏理论减缓方法。 通过转换TRA和诚实的行为,自私节点在追求高QOS时进行不起作用的多阶段游戏。我们分析可行的节点战略,设计一个分布式信号机制,称为DISTRESS,根据某些条件,游戏产生一个理想的结果:在上层游戏时间后,诚实往往成为自私的节点,同时让大多数或所有节点都接受QoS。 我们通过蒙特卡洛和Ns-3的移动和无移动模拟来核实这些结论。