This paper develops the Theory of Strategic Evolution, a general model for systems in which the population of players, strategies, and institutional rules evolve together. The theory extends replicator dynamics to settings with endogenous players, multi level selection, innovation, constitutional change, and meta governance. The central mathematical object is a Poiesis stack: a hierarchy of strategic layers linked by cross level gain matrices. Under small gain conditions, the system admits a global Lyapunov function and satisfies selection, tracking, and stochastic stability results at every finite depth. We prove that the class is closed under block extension, innovation events, heterogeneous utilities, continuous strategy spaces, and constitutional evolution. The closure theorem shows that no new dynamics arise at higher levels and that unrestricted self modification cannot preserve Lyapunov structure. The theory unifies results from evolutionary game theory, institutional design, innovation dynamics, and constitutional political economy, providing a general mathematical model of long run strategic adaptation.

翻译：本文发展了战略演化理论，为参与者群体、策略及制度规则共同演化的系统构建了一个通用模型。该理论将复制者动态拓展至具有内生参与者、多层级选择、创新、宪制变迁及元治理的情境中。核心数学对象为Poiesis栈：一种通过跨层级增益矩阵连接的战略层级结构。在小增益条件下，系统存在全局Lyapunov函数，并在任意有限深度满足选择、追踪及随机稳定性结果。我们证明该类在块扩展、创新事件、异质效用、连续策略空间及宪制演化下具有封闭性。封闭定理表明更高层级不会产生新动力学，且无限制的自我修正无法保持Lyapunov结构。该理论统一了演化博弈论、制度设计、创新动力学及宪制政治经济学的成果，为长期战略适应提供了通用数学模型。