We consider a two-stage market mechanism for trading electricity including renewable generation as an alternative to the widely used multi-settlement market structure. The two-stage market structure allows for recourse decisions by the market operator, which are not possible in today's markets. We allow for different conventional generation cost curves in the forward and the real-time stages. We have considered costs of demand response programs and black outs, and adopt a DC power flow model to account for network constraints. Our first result is to show existence (by construction) of a sequential competitive equilibrium (SCEq) in such a two-stage market. We argue social welfare properties of such an SCEq, and then design a market mechanism that achieves social welfare maximization when the market participants are non-strategic. We also show that under either a congestion-free or a monopoly-free condition, an efficient Nash equilibrium exists.

翻译：我们认为,两阶段市场结构允许市场经营者作出追索决定,在今天的市场中是不可能的。我们允许前方和实时阶段不同的传统发电成本曲线。我们考虑了需求响应方案和断电的成本,并采用了DC电力流动模式来应对网络制约。我们的第一个结果是(通过建造)在这样一个两阶段市场中显示相继的竞争平衡(SCEq)的存在。我们提出这样一个SCEq的社会福利特性,然后设计一个市场机制,在市场参与者不是战略参与者时实现社会福利最大化。我们还表明,在无拥堵或无垄断条件下,有效的纳什平衡存在。