We study the robustness of data-centric methods to find neural network architectures, known as neural architecture search (NAS), against data poisoning. To audit this robustness, we design a poisoning framework that enables the systematic evaluation of the ability of NAS to produce architectures under data corruption. Our framework examines four off-the-shelf NAS algorithms, representing different approaches to architecture discovery, against four data poisoning attacks, including one we tailor specifically for NAS. In our evaluation with the CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 benchmarks, we show that NAS is \emph{seemingly} robust to data poisoning, showing marginal accuracy drops even under large poisoning budgets. However, we demonstrate that when considering NAS algorithms designed to achieve a few percentage points of accuracy gain, this expected improvement can be substantially diminished under data poisoning. We also show that the reduction varies across NAS algorithms and analyze the factors contributing to their robustness. Our findings are: (1) Training-based NAS algorithms are the least robust due to their reliance on data. (2) Training-free NAS approaches are the most robust but produce architectures that perform similarly to random selections from the search space. (3) NAS algorithms can produce architectures with improved accuracy, even when using out-of-distribution data like MNIST. We lastly discuss potential countermeasures. Our code is available at: https://github.com/ztcoalson/NAS-Robustness-to-Data-Poisoning

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