An axiomatic characterization of Nash equilibrium is provided for games in normal form. The Nash equilibrium correspondence is shown to be fully characterized by four simple and intuitive axioms, two of which are inspired by contraction and expansion consistency properties from the literature on abstract choice theory. The axiomatization applies to Nash equilibria in pure and mixed strategies alike, to games with strategy sets of any cardinality, and it does not require that players' preferences have a utility or expected utility representation.

翻译：本文为正规形式博弈提供了纳什均衡的公理化刻画。纳什均衡对应关系被证明完全由四个简单且直观的公理所刻画，其中两个公理受到抽象选择理论文献中收缩一致性和扩张一致性性质的启发。该公理化表述同时适用于纯策略与混合策略下的纳什均衡，适用于任意基数策略集的博弈，且不要求参与者的偏好具有效用或期望效用表示。