In this paper we present new arithmetical and algebraic results following the work of Babindamana and al. on hyperbolas and describe in the new results an approach to attacking a RSA-type modulus based on continued fractions, independent and not bounded by the size of the private key $d$ nor the public exponent $e$ compared to Wiener's attack. When successful, this attack is bounded by $\displaystyle\mathcal{O}\left( b\log{\alpha_{j4}}\log{(\alpha_{i3}+\alpha_{j3})}\right)$ with $b=10^{y}$, $\alpha_{i3}+\alpha_{j3}$ a non trivial factor of $n$ and $\alpha_{j4}$ such that $(n+1)/(n-1)=\alpha_{i4}/\alpha_{j4}$. The primary goal of this attack is to find a point $\displaystyle X_{\alpha}=\left(-\alpha_{3}, \ \alpha_{3}+1 \right) \in \mathbb{Z}^{2}_{\star}$ that satisfies $\displaystyle\left\langle X_{\alpha_{3}}, \ P_{3} \right\rangle =0$ from a convergent of $\displaystyle\frac{\alpha_{i4}}{\alpha_{j4}}+\delta$, with $P_{3}\in \mathcal{B}_{n}(x, y)_{\mid_{x\geq 4n}}$. We finally present some experimental examples. We believe these results constitute a new direction in RSA Cryptanalysis using continued fractions independently of parameters $e$ and $d$.

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