In recent years, the security issues of artificial intelligence have become increasingly prominent due to the rapid development of deep learning research and applications. Backdoor attack is an attack targeting the vulnerability of deep learning models, where hidden backdoors are activated by triggers embedded by the attacker, thereby outputting malicious predictions that may not align with the intended output for a given input. In this work, we propose a novel black-box backdoor attack based on machine unlearning. The attacker first augments the training set with carefully designed samples, including poison and mitigation data, to train a `benign' model. Then, the attacker posts unlearning requests for the mitigation samples to remove the impact of relevant data on the model, gradually activating the hidden backdoor. Since backdoors are implanted during the iterative unlearning process, it significantly increases the computational overhead of existing defense methods for backdoor detection or mitigation. To address this new security threat, we proposes two methods for detecting or mitigating such malicious unlearning requests. We conduct the experiment in both exact unlearning and approximate unlearning (i.e., SISA) settings. Experimental results indicate that: 1) our attack approach can successfully implant backdoor into the model, and sharding increases the difficult of attack; 2) our detection algorithms are effective in identifying the mitigation samples, while sharding reduces the effectiveness of our detection algorithms.

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