Incentives for early arrival (I4EA) was recently proposed for studying online cooperative games. In an online cooperative game, players arrive in an unknown order, and the value increase after each player arrived should be distributed immediately among all the arrived players. Although there is only one arriving order in the game, we also hope that the value distribution is equal to their Shapley value in expectation. To achieve these goals, the early solutions ignored the fairness in each single arriving order. More specifically, an important player may receive nothing in a game, which seems unfair in reality. To combat this, we propose refined fairness in this paper and design new solutions in 0-1 value games. Specifically, we compute the distance of the distribution in each order to the Shapley value and aim to minimize it. We propose a new mechanism called Egalitarian Value-Sharing (EVS) to do so. We also show that the mechanism can maximize the egalitarian welfare among all the players who made contributions.

翻译：近期提出的提前到达激励机制（I4EA）旨在研究在线合作博弈。在在线合作博弈中，参与者以未知顺序到达，每位参与者到达后产生的价值增量需立即在所有已到达参与者间分配。尽管博弈中仅存在一种到达顺序，我们仍期望价值分配的期望值等于其沙普利值。为实现这些目标，早期解决方案忽略了单个到达顺序中的公平性。具体而言，重要参与者在博弈中可能一无所获，这在现实中显得不公。为解决此问题，本文提出精细化公平性概念，并为0-1价值博弈设计新解决方案。我们通过计算每个到达顺序中分配结果与沙普利值的距离，并以最小化该距离为目标，提出名为“平等价值共享”（EVS）的新机制。研究同时证明，该机制能最大化所有贡献参与者的平等福利。