We lay out a model of games with imperfect information that features explicit communication actions, by which the entire observation history of a player is revealed to another player. Such full-information protocols are common in asynchronous distributed systems; here, we consider a synchronous setting with a single active player who may communicate with multiple passive observers in an indeterminate environment. We present a procedure for solving the basic strategy-synthesis problem under regular winning conditions. We present our solution in an abstract framework of games with imperfect information and we split the proof in two conceptual parts: (i) a generic reduction schema from imperfect-information to perfect-information games, and (ii) a specific construction for full-information protocols that satisfies the requirement of the reduction schema. Furthermore we show that the number of passive observers induces a strict hierarchy, both in terms of expressiveness and complexity: with n observers, a full-information protocol can express indistinguishability relations (defining imperfect information for the player in the protocol) that are not expressible with n-1 observers, and the strategy-synthesis problem is (n+1)-EXPTIME-complete.

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