A finite impulse response (FIR) filter is a ubiquitous block in digital signal processing applications. Its characteristics are determined by its coefficients, which are the intellectual property (IP) for its designer. However, in a hardware efficient realization, its coefficients become vulnerable to reverse engineering. This paper presents a filter design technique that can protect this IP, taking into account hardware complexity and ensuring that the filter behaves as specified only when a secret key is provided. To do so, coefficients are hidden among decoys, which are selected beyond possible values of coefficients using three alternative methods. As an attack scenario, an adversary at an untrusted foundry is considered. A reverse engineering technique is developed to find the chosen decoy selection method and explore the potential leakage of coefficients through decoys. An oracle-less attack is also used to find the secret key. Experimental results show that the proposed technique can lead to filter designs with competitive hardware complexity and higher resiliency to attacks with respect to previously proposed methods.

翻译：有限的脉冲反应过滤器(FIR)是数字信号处理应用程序中一个无处不在的屏障。 它的特性由它的系数决定,这是设计者的知识产权(IP), 但是,在硬件效率的实现中,它的系数容易发生反向工程。 本文提出了一个过滤设计技术,可以保护这个 IP, 同时考虑到硬件的复杂性, 并确保过滤器只有在提供秘密密钥时才按规定行事。 为了这样做, 诱饵中隐藏了系数, 诱饵被选择的值超过使用三种替代方法的系数值。 作为攻击假设, 考虑在不可信的铸造厂中进行对手。 开发了一种反向工程技术, 以寻找选择的诱饵选择方法, 并探索通过诱饵渗漏系数的可能性。 也使用了一种无孔攻击来寻找秘密密钥。 实验结果显示, 拟议的技术可以导致筛选具有竞争性硬件复杂性和对先前建议的方法进行攻击的更大弹性的设计。