The choice to participate in a data-driven service, often made on the basis of quality of that service, influences the ability of the service to learn and improve. We study the participation and retraining dynamics that arise when both the learners and sub-populations of users are \emph{risk-reducing}, which cover a broad class of updates including gradient descent, multiplicative weights, etc. Suppose, for example, that individuals choose to spend their time amongst social media platforms proportionally to how well each platform works for them. Each platform also gathers data about its active users, which it uses to update parameters with a gradient step. For this example and for our general class of dynamics, we show that the only asymptotically stable equilibria are segmented, with sub-populations allocated to a single learner. Under mild assumptions, the utilitarian social optimum is a stable equilibrium. In contrast to previous work, which shows that repeated risk minimization can result in representation disparity and high overall loss for a single learner \citep{hashimoto2018fairness,miller2021outside}, we find that repeated myopic updates with multiple learners lead to better outcomes. We illustrate the phenomena via a simulated example initialized from real data.

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