Von Neumann founded both game theory and the theory of self-reproducing automata, but the two programs never merged. This paper provides the synthesis. The Theory of Strategic Evolution analyzes strategic replicators: entities that optimize under resource constraints and spawn copies of themselves. We introduce Games with Endogenous Players (GEPs), where lineages (not instances) are the fundamental strategic units, and define Evolutionarily Stable Distributions of Intelligence (ESDIs) as the resulting equilibrium concept. The central mathematical object is a hierarchy of strategic layers linked by cross-level gain matrices. Under a small-gain condition (spectral radius less than one), the system admits a global Lyapunov function at every finite depth. We prove closure under meta-selection: adding governance levels, innovation, or constitutional evolution preserves the dynamical structure. The Alignment Impossibility Theorem shows that unrestricted self-modification destroys this structure; stable alignment requires bounded modification classes. Applications include AI deployment dynamics, market concentration, and institutional design. The framework shows why personality engineering fails under selection pressure and identifies constitutional constraints necessary for stable multi-agent systems.

翻译：冯·诺依曼奠定了博弈论与自复制自动机理论的基础，但这两个研究纲领从未融合。本文实现了二者的综合。战略演化理论分析战略复制体：即在资源约束下进行优化并自我复制的实体。我们引入内生参与者博弈，其中谱系（而非个体实例）是基本的战略单元，并将演化稳定智能分布定义为相应的均衡概念。核心数学对象是通过跨层级增益矩阵连接的战略层级结构。在小增益条件（谱半径小于一）下，系统在每个有限深度均存在全局李雅普诺夫函数。我们证明了元选择下的封闭性：增加治理层级、创新或宪制演化均能保持该动力学结构。对齐不可能定理表明，无限制的自我修改会破坏该结构；稳定的对齐需要受限的修改类别。应用领域包括人工智能部署动力学、市场集中度与制度设计。该框架揭示了选择压力下人格工程失效的原因，并识别了稳定多智能体系统所需的宪制约束条件。