If a measure of voting power assigns players greater voting power because they no longer effectively cooperate, then it displays the quarrelling paradox and violates the quarrel postulate. However, we prove that certain types of quarrel increase some quarrellers' voting power on any proposed measure. On the one hand, such quarrels are politically significant because they incentivize players to strategically join coalitions in order to sabotage them from within; on the other, a postulate based on them cannot provide a reasonable normative criterion for evaluating measures of voting power. We therefore formalize a general framework of quarrels -- comprising twelve conceptions distinguished according to symmetry, reciprocality, and strength -- and provide criteria for whether a conception provides a suitable basis for a reasonable quarrel postulate. Although the two existing conceptions, proposed by Felsenthal and Machover and by Laruelle and Valenciano, do not, our framework's symmetric, weak conception does.

翻译：如果一种投票权力度量方法因参与者不再有效合作而赋予其更大的投票权力，则该方法表现出争吵悖论并违反了争吵公设。然而，我们证明特定类型的争吵会基于任何提议的度量方法增加部分争吵者的投票权力。一方面，此类争吵具有政治意义，因为它们激励参与者策略性地加入联盟以从内部破坏联盟；另一方面，基于这些争吵的公设无法为评估投票权力度量方法提供合理的规范性标准。因此，我们形式化了一个通用的争吵框架——包含根据对称性、互易性和强度区分的十二种概念——并提供了判断某一概念是否能为合理的争吵公设提供合适基础的标准。尽管现有由Felsenthal和Machover以及Laruelle和Valenciano提出的两种概念不符合标准，但我们框架中对称的弱概念符合要求。